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Abstract: According to several contemporary witnesses, and many nowadays historians, one of the key 
instruments used by the Italian social and political élite of the 19th century to secure the national unifica-
tion (and the monarchy as the leading institution of the newborn state) was the army. What few of 
them has noted, however, is that the army and the military who controlled it were more than an in-
strument: they were an essential part of the Italian national élite, capable of influencing the nation-
building process itself. The Italian army officers, and specifically the general staff ones, attended univer-
sity-level military academies where social sciences were taught along with general history, human geog-
raphy and foreign languages. They travelled the world and confronted themselves with fellow officers 
from different social, political and cultural contexts. They took part in politics and local administration, 
as well as in economical enterprises. Above all, they were well aware of the role the army was supposed to 
hold in the institutional and symbolic panorama of unified Italy and pre-war Europe. And they wrote 
about all of this.  
The research project is grounded on two main sources. On one hand, the quantitative analysis of the 
careers and the biographies of 250 general staff officers who attained specific roles of great responsibility 
and relative autonomy from 1882 to 1915. On the other hand, correspondence, diaries, unpublished 
memoirs found in several private and family archives – in other words, those unofficial, unseen writings 
that we think could be more telling than the formal ones in revealing the military personal beliefs and 
cultural affiliations and influences. Crossing the quantitative and qualitative outputs, we can explore in 
depth the influence of military in the conception of politics, education, nationalization processes or social 
relationships in a case study, the Italian one, that is either peculiar and well integrated in the wider belle 
époque European context.  
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Resumen: Según varios testigos de época y muchos historiadores de la actualidad, uno de los instrumen-
tos clave utilizados por la élite social y política italiana del siglo XIX a la hora de lograr la unificación 
nacional (y la monarquía como institución al mando del estado recién nacido) fue el ejército. Sin embar-
go, lo que pocos de ellos han visto es que el ejército y los militares que controlaron dicho proceso fueron 
más que un mero instrumento: ambos fueron una parte esencial de la élite nacional italiana, capaces de 
influenciar el proceso de construcción nacional en sí mismo. Los oficiales del ejército italiano, y especial-
mente los miembros del estado mayor, se formaron en academias militares con un nivel de educación 
universitario donde se enseñaban ciencias sociales junto con historia general, geografía humana y lenguas 
extranjeras. Éstos viajaron por el mundo y lidiaron con colegas de diferentes orígenes sociales, políticos y 
culturales. Tomaron parte en la política y en la administración local, así como también en empresas 
económicas. Sobre todo, fueron bien conscientes del papel que se suponía que el ejército debía ostentar en 
el panorama institucional y simbólico de la Italia unificada y la Europa de preguerra, de ahí que escribie-
ran sobre todas estas cuestiones. 
Este proyecto de investigación está basado en dos fuentes fundamentales. Por un lado el análisis cuanti-
tativo de las carreras y las biografías de 250 generales del estado mayor que ostentaron papeles específicos 
de gran responsabilidad y relativa autonomía desde 1882 a 1915. Por otro lado, correspondencia, diarios 
y memorias inéditas encontradas en varios archivos privados y familiares –en otras palabras, aquellos 
escritos no oficiales nunca vistos que pensamos que podrían ser más reveladores que aquellos formales a 
la hora de revelar el pensamiento del personal militar y sus influencias o filiaciones culturales. Cruzando 
los resultados cuantitativos y cualitativos podemos explorar en profundidad la influencia de los militares 
en la concepción de la política, la educación, los procesos de nacionalización y las relaciones sociales en un 
caso de estudio, el italiano, que es peculiar y que al mismo tiempo se encuentra bien integrado en el con-
texto europeo más amplio de la belle époque. 
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ccording to several contemporary witnesses, and many nowadays historians, one of 
the key instruments used by the Italian social and political élite of the 19th century to 
secure the national unification (and the monarchy as the leading institution of the 
newborn state) was the army.1 However, few had noticed that the army and the military who 
controlled it were more than an instrument: they were an essential part of the Italian national 
élite, debating about and participating in national and local politics. 
We chose to explore that field through the correspondences entertained by these offi-
cers who were members of the Italian military élite of the time.2 Army corps commanders, 
Chiefs of the General Staff, War Ministers, but also military attaches, chiefs of the War Minis-
ter divisions and General Staff bureaux: what we found examining the writings, and the career 
paths, of these men renders an image of Italian officers in Liberal Italy very different from the 
bureaucrats or jingoist technicians many military historiography have portrayed so far.3 Along 
with this has gone the supposition –largely the result of the unavailability of the kind of sources 
the author has so strikingly found– that the army was dominated by Piedmontese generals 
                                                          
1 Cf. John GOOCH: Army, state and society in Italy, New York, St. Martin's, 1989; Piero DEL NEGRO, 
Nicola LABANCA, and Alessandra STADERINI: Militarizzazione e nazionalizzazione nella storia d’Italia, 
Milan, Unicopli, 2005; Marco ROVINELLO: “«Giuro di essere fedele al Re ed a’ suoi reali successori». 
Disciplina militare, civilizzazione e nazionalizzazione nell’Italia liberale”, Storica, 49 (2011). 
2 We define as military élite member every officer who filled a concretely influential role inside the mili-
tary institution for a significant amount of time (at least one year). During our PhD research we deter-
mined ten roles which present the characters of autonomy and effectiveness we searched for. Between 
1882 and 1915, our research time limits, and according to the Italian military yearbook (Annuario Militare 
del Regno d'Italia), 247 officers filled these roles. We built up a prosopographic database using as 
sources two biographical encyclopaedias (Enciclopedia Militare Italiana and the still uncomplete Dizi-
onario Biografico degli Italiani), and several wedding publications, obituaries, commemorative articles 
found in the catalogues of the Italian National Library of Florence. Then, we found some private and 
family archives that enabled us to see from the inside the military élite debates. We hope that a full ver-
sion of our work will be published as soon as possible. Meanwhile, for a nearly exhaustive overview of 
our secondary sources, Cf. Nicola LABANCA: Storie di guerre ed eserciti. Gli studi italiani di storia milita-
re negli ultimi venticinque anni, Milan, Unicopli, 2011. 
3 Cf. Giorgio ROCHAT and Giulio MASSOBRIO: Breve storia dell'Esercito Italiano dal 1861 al 1943, Turin, 
Einaudi, 1978; John WHITTAM: The politics of the Italian army, Croom Helm, 1977; Paolo LANGELLA: 
Cultura e vita dell'ufficiale italiano (1878-1911), in Esercito e città dall'Unità agli Anni Trenta (2 voll.), 
conference proceedings Perouse-Rome, 1989. 
A
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who were of a very conservative and avowedly monarchist caste of mind.4 That view has al-
ready been challenged in some respects: for example it has been argued that the army did not 
like the public order role, regarded it as an unwelcome diversion of energy, effort and money, 
but nevertheless carried it out dutifully.5 The following paragraphs will try to widen and 
enlighten the grey areas that still linger around the social and figure of XIX Century Italian 
Army officers, and their connection with politics. 
 
Parliament and national government 
 
It is a fact that 139 officers out of the 247 that formed the Italian military élite between 
1882 and 1915 did not sit in a representative Chamber, determining a majority of “disengaged” 
military, but 98 others did. In other words, the 44% of the Italian military élite was either a 
Parliament member, a senator, or sometimes even both, which is not a negligible percentage. 
Furthermore, if more than half the senators did not afford an election campaign in spite of be-
ing nominated for relevant professional performances, 43 officers decided to take the chance to 
be elected to the representative Chamber undertaking an actual political career. Lastly, it must 
be considered that some of the 139 officers who did not enter the Parliament actually tried to, 
sometimes more than once and in different electoral districts, without succeeding. Taking into 
account these failures, which often involved the same intensity of political activity performed 
in a successful campaign, would certainly raise the percentage of the military élite members 
involved in national politics above 44%. 
We wrote that 43 officers undertook an actual political career because the majority 
among them had his first campaign way before becoming general, or even member of the élite. 
Out of 43 Parliament members, 23 became so as majors, lieutenant colonels or colonels, while 
28 were under 50 years old the first time they entered the Chamber. 
 
Menabrea 1848 Verres (C) C-DX Sar 39 lieutcol x 
Durando Giacomo 1848 Mondovì (C) C-DX Vol 41 colonel x 
Thaon di Revel Genova 1857 Cassino DX Sar 40 lieutcol x 
Cosenz  1860 Como DX Gar 40 general x 
Longo 1861 Napoli SX Gar 43 general  
Torre 1861 Benevento (C) C-DX Gar 46 colonel  
                                                          
4 Cf. Piero PIERI: Storia militare del Risorgimento, Turin,Einaudi, 1962; Massimo MAZZETTI: “Dagli eserci-
ti preunitari all'Esercito Italiano”, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, LIX (1972). 
5 Cf. Hubert HEYRIES, «L’armée italienne et le maintien de l’ordre dans les villes, de 1871 à 1915, d’après 
les attachés militaires français», Guerre de rue, guerre dans la rue, Guerres mondiales et conflits con-
temporains, avril-juin 2002/206; Giuseppe CONTI, "Fare gli italiani". Esercito permanente e "nazione ar-
mata" nell'Italia liberale, Unicopli, Milan 2012. 
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Pianell 1867 Napoli DX DS 49 general x 
Bertolé-Viale 1867 Crescentino (C) C-DX Sar 38 general x 
Asinari di San Marzano 1870 Nizza Monferrato 
(C) 
DX Sar 40 colonel x 
Ricotti-Magnani 1870 Novara (C) DX Sar 48 general x 
Veroggio 1874 Castel S. Giovanni  Sar 46 colonel  
Pasi 1874 Forlì (C) DX Vol 55 general  
Corvetto 1874 Cagli C-DX Sar 44 lieutcol x 
Marselli 1874 Pescina C DS 42 major  
Gandolfi 1874 Carpi (C) SX Moden
a 
39 major x 
Mocenni 1874 Siena (C) DX GrTosc 37 lieutcol x 
Morra di Lavriano 1874 Carmagnola (C) DX Sar 44 colonel x 
Primerano 1876 Città di Castello SX DS 47 colonel x 
Geymet 1876 Bricherasio (C) C-SX Sar 45 lieutcol  
Dezza 1876 Codogno (C) DX Gar 46 general  
Sani 1876 Rovigo (C) C-SX Gar 43 general x 
Baratieri 1876 Breno (C) SX Gar 35 major  
Mattei 1880 Venezia DX Sar 55 general  
Pelloux Luigi 1880 Livorno SX Sar 41 colonel si 
Di Lenna 1880 Tolmezzo (C) DX Vol 42 lieutcol  
Pozzolini 1880 Firenze (C) DX Vol 46 colonel  
Menotti 1882 Modena (C) DX Vol 55 general x 
Ricci 1882 Belluno DX Vol 50 general  
Villani 1882 Firenze (C) C GrTosc 55 general  
Mirri 1886 Imola (C) DX Gar 52 general  
Rolandi 1886 Genova (C) SX Sar 59 general x 
Adami 1886 Cuneo (C) C-SX Sar 52 colonel  
Strani 1890 Monteleone 
Calabro (C) 
  44 lieutcol  
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Afan de Rivera 1890 Napoli (C) C-DX DS 48 colonel x 
Dal Verme 1890 Pavia (C) C-DX Vol 52 colonel x 
Carenzi 1890 Pisa C-SX Vol 53 general x 
Grandi 1892 Senigallia (C) SX  43 tencol x 
Masi 1892 Lugo (C) C-DX  39 tencol  
Bogliolo 1895 Nizza Monferrato 
(C) 
SX Sar 58 general  
Pistoja 1900 Casalmaggiore (C) C-SX Vol 62 general  
Spingardi 1904 Anagni C-SX  59 general x 
Mazzitelli 1904 Teano (C) C-SX  59 general  
Mirabelli 1909 Teano (C) C  59 general x 
Chart 1: Parliament members: year of  election (first time), district (C=home district), political 
positioning (C=center, DX=right wing, SX=left wing), pre-unitary experience, age, military 
rank, late government role (x=yes). 
 
In the chart above we can pinpoint several other traits that characterised the contin-
gent of officers who got involved in parliamentarian works. Apparently, the pre-unitary ex-
perience plays a great role when it comes to getting some officers to the political career. The 
groups that became minorities into the military after 1861, for instance the Garibaldini, are 
definitely over-represented into the Chamber. Former Armata Sarda officers are indeed only 14 
out of 43, a rough 30% that contrasts sharply with the more than 50% of their weight into the 
élite ranks. On the contrary, the Garibaldini represents the 19% of the Parliament and the 8% 
of the élite members. Also the officers who came from the others pre-unitary armies of the Pen-
insula are more present in Parliament than they are in the ranks. At least for the Garibaldini 
and for the officers who belonged to “loser” pre-unitary states, being elected has all the hall-
marks of a self-legitimation strategy. 
The 45% of all the military élite members became second lieutenant after 1861, and 
consequently did not have a militant pre-unitary experience, but only 6 of them entered the 
Chamber. This fact, apparently in line with what Labanca and Del Negro wrote about the 
progressive disaffection between Italian officers and politics,6 might also have a different inter-
pretation. Among the six we find only one officer comes from the territory of the old Kingdom 
of Sardinia (Spingardi), while the other five are from Romagna region (Masi), Marche (Grandi), 
both former territories of the Papal State, and three from the South (Strani from Calabria, 
Mazzitelli and Mirabelli from Naples). The geography of disaffection seems therefore very dis-
                                                          
6 Nicola LABANCA: Militari deputati e deputati militari, in Roberto CAFORIO, Piero DEL NEGRO (eds.), 
Ufficiali e Società, interpretazioni e modelli, Milan, Unicopli, 1988. 
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proportionate. In other words, the ones who abandon the Parliament at the beginning of the 
20th Century are Piedmontese officers, much more than the military élite in its entirety.  
Where did the officers who entered the Parliament decide to campaign? 30 out of 43 did 
it in their home district, where they had family and social networks, and often their properties 
or estates. On the other hand, only 13 officers took a chance in districts that were far from their 
hometown. Therefore, we can conclude that many officers conceived the role of Parliament 
member not only as a national issue, but also as a way to maintain, renew or gain power, re-
spectability and social  distinction on a local scale – just as many of the Italian “notables” of the 
time did. 
Once they had made their way to the Parliament, officers entered one of the political 
line-ups which dominated Liberal Italy political life. In fact only two of them (Veroggio and 
Strani) did not show a clear political positioning, while all the others 41 sided with either Sinis-
tra Storica (liberal left), the pro-government Center or, most of them, Destra Storica (liberal 
right). However, it might be hasty to conclude that the majority of the military élite members 
who got into the Parliament were right-handed. General Mirri for instance, a former Garibald-
ino who entered the Chamber in 1886 sitting on the right side, became in the 1890s a strenuous 
supporter of Francesco Crispi, leader of the Sinistra Storica. General Pelloux, on the other 
hand, was a leading “leftist” exponent through all the 1880s, becoming also minister in the first 
Giolitti cabinet, but ended up leading the so-called bourgeoisie Putsch in the final years of the 
Century. In conclusion, to evaluate officers political penchants as an aggregate is far from being 
easy or clarifying, not least because Liberal Italy political structure was very different from her 
two-parties British model.  
More important is to note that the members of the military élite never assembled an 
homogeneous “military party” inside the Parliament. They never seated all on the same side 
(left or right as it was), they participated in some governments but not in others (carrying out 
political-based choices). Finally, it can be clearly seen from their mutual correspondence that 
they had different ideas about military issues, as well as about national and international poli-
tics. 
Leaving aside for a moment the Parliament members, let's turn to the 90 officers who 
became senators. 
The aggregate tells us that military senators mirrored the larger military élite way more 
than their colleagues in the Chamber. While in the latter we had a 30% of former Kingdom of 
Sardinia officers, in the Senate we find a 52% that lines up with the élite average. Also the per-
centages of former volunteers and Garibaldini are the same in the Senate and in the élite. Look-
ing at this fact from another point of view, we can say that the alleged predilection of the Sa-
voy for Piedmontese officers and generals does not emerge in any way, as the latter were not 
over-represented in the upper house. 
We saw that after the turn of the Century, the Piedmontese élite members in the lower 
house were abruptly reduced to one. Looking at the Senate, on the contrary, we do not find 
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any change in the number of Piedmontese officers before and after the year 1900. Only in the 
last five years (1911-15) they fell to a 20% from their usual 50%. On one hand, thus, the Senate 
mirrors the persistence of Piedmont weight into the military élite, but on the other hand it sig-
nals its decay in the years that preceded the World War. 
Once examined the numbers, we must interrogate ourselves about how military élite 
members fulfilled their role of parliamentary spokesmen. Among the lower house members, 18 
out of 43 took part in some parliamentary committee works, while 15 others presented at least 
one law proposal. If we accept that the Senate was way less politically active than the lower 
chamber was, we would expect that the military senators did not perform such high levels of 
participation. On the contrary, 43 senators out of 90 took part in a committee works, and 23 
others presented at least one law proposal. Fair enough, among them we find many war minis-
ters who presented big quantities of law proposals: 108 Luigi Pelloux, 88 Spingardi, 77 Ricotti, 
58 Zupelli, 48 Menabrea, 47 Bertolé-Viale, 37 Viganò and 36 Emilio Ferrero. Still, we find also 
two laws signed by generals Pistoja and Baratieri, and one by general Giuseppe Di Lenna. 
Moreover, being an active member of the Parliament was a very highly regarded quality 
among the colleagues, both inside the military institution and the Parliament itself. General 
Francesco Mazza defines the colleague Luchino Dal Verme as «eminent» among all the Par-
liament members: 
 
Ed io me ne compiaccio non soltanto come amico e compatriota tuo, ma anche come militare, 
perché l'esercito non può augurarsi di meglio che veder gli uomini del tuo stampo acquistare 
credito ed influenza in Parlamento.7 
 
44 senators fulfilled a government role, and 23 out of 43 members of the lower house did 
it as well: especially the latter fact signals that a candidature to the Parliament could be the 
first step of a career as brilliant as the military one, or even more. Furthermore, some officers 
assumed key roles not only at the head of the War Ministry, but also in other important gov-
ernment bodies. The Foreign Ministry is led, among others, by three military élite members 
(Durando, Menabrea, Nicolis Di Robilant), and there is plenty of officers in the ranks of the 
diplomatic corps. The same general Menabrea and his colleague Afan de Rivera managed the 
Ministry of Public Works, while in the same department Giuseppe di Lenna was inspector-
general of the railways network for ten years (1885-95). General Ottone Tournon collaborated 
with the Postal and Telegraph Service Ministry to build the Italian telegraphic network in the 
1870s. 
To be nominated at the head of a ministry was indeed a risky business. An outstanding 
military career  could be done in a few days, as happened to general Mocenni who was ruth-
lessly dismissed from either the War Ministry and his military command after the Adua disas-
                                                          
7 Dal Verme private archive (Torre degli Alberi, Italy; from now on: DVA), Mazza to Dal Verme, 
22/02/1893. 
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ter. The physical and mental health of an officer could also be undermined by the 10, 12 or 
even 14 hours of work per day that the role of War Minister entiled. General Govone suffered a 
serious mental breakdown during the Porta Pia crisis that eventually led to his death, and his 
colleague Bernardino Milon died of a hearth attack at 52 in 1881. General Afan de Rivera, un-
der-secretary at the War Ministry in 1896, defined the amount of daily work he had to face 
there as a «death warrant».8  
Lastly, to live in Rome sometimes was too much of an effort for the budget of some of-
ficers. Even the Chief of the General Staff Domenico Primerano, after resigning in the summer 
of 1896, is forced to get relocated in his daughter's house to be able to remain in Rome.9 
 
A candidate's Manifesto 
 
In the winter of 1894, general Luigi Majnoni d'Intignano, an aristocrat from the little 
town of Erba in Lombardy, ran for the second time to become his district representative in the 
lower house. General Majnoni's is one of these cases where an officer participates in a campaign 
without succeeding, and more than once: in fact he ran for the Erba seat twice (1880 and 1894), 
but he was always beaten by another local “notable”. Despite his bad luck, Majnoni's case 
gives us an insight into which strategies an officer could adopt during an election campaign, as 
well as into his political ideas.  
First of all the general, who is also a local “notable” given the fact that he is the son of a 
former city mayor, an that he owns several villas and estates in the district, gathers a commit-
tee which includes several other important people from the province to support his nomina-
tion. Among them we can find aristocrats (marchese Crivelli, conte Sormani Andreani, conte 
Turati, noble Parravicini), professionals (lawyers, doctors, notaries and engineers), fellow offi-
cers, a senator (Giuseppe Gadda).10 Given the limited suffrage effective in 1880, the first time 
Majnoni ran for the seat a list like that would have been enough to guarantee a chance of win-
ning, but since the 1882 law more than doubled the potential electors the general had to im-
plement other tools.  
Beyond some populist leaflets distributed by his supporters in the countryside,11 which 
were themselves truly modern propaganda, Majnoni was forced to take the field in person, 
writing a political Manifesto. In this document, dated 10th december 1894, the Lombard gen-
eral makes a profession of faith in liberal conservatism:  
 
                                                          
8 “Una condanna di morte bella e buona”, DVA, Afan to Dal Verme, 2/10/1896. 
9 Sismondo private archive (Rome, Italy; from now on SA), Primerano to Sismondo, 10/08/1896. 
10 Majnoni private archive (Erba, Italy; from now on MA), 160, 15, Lettere, programma, discorsi, 
documenti e giornali relativi alla candidatura nel collegio di Erba, 1894. 
11 MA, 160, 15. 
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Sarò per quel governo che, rispettando la libertà dei cittadini, non pieghi a che questo si cambi 
in licenza, e che svolgendo la sua azione nell'orbita delle leggi, mantenga l'ordine. L'ordine nella 
libertà è l'indice più sicuro della natura civile di un popolo. 
Assicurato l'ordine, pacificati gli animi delle provincie, che sobillate dal miraggio di un avvenire 
impossibile, inconsciamente tentarono di disfare l'opera a prezzo di tanto sangue e di tanti sacri-
fici edificata, voterò per quel governo che garantirà la sicurezza dei cittadini nella persona e negli 
averi, per quel governo che senza debolezze e senza arroganze tenga alta all'estero la nostra dig-
nità, che con opportuni trattati favorisca le nostre industrie, e con leggi adatte aiuti lo sviluppo 
dell'agricoltura, precipua base della ricchezza nazionale; per qual governo che, pur rispettando la 
libertà di coscienza, non ostacoli la religione dei nostri padri, che la giustizia non asservi alla poli-
tica, e ne mantenga la sovrana indipendenza. Appoggerò quindi le leggi intente ad affidare all'i-
niziativa privata la soluzione degli importanti problemi che riflettono la viabilità, le industrie, i 
traffici per terra e per mare, lo sviluppo delle colonie.12 
 
Despite his conservative ideas about agriculture and «liberty through order», general 
Majnoni expresses some truly liberal positions as administrative decentralization and infra-
structure privatisation, which are far from being shared by the theoretically liberal Italian es-
tablishment of the time. Then it comes a sample of emblematic XIX Century paternalism, 
although its tone is far from being typical: clearly aware of the challenge represented by social-
ist movements, the general declares himself to be an advocate of some very substantial social 
laws: 
 
Avranno l'incondizionato mio appoggio: le leggi sociali dirette ad aiutare gli sforzi e a mitigare le 
sofferenze dei diseredati dalla fortuna, le leggi protettrici dell'infanzia, quelle sul lavoro dei fan-
ciulli, e quelle infine che mirino a confortare di un aiuto, che li sostenga nell'ultima fase della bat-
taglia, coloro che spesero tutte le forze nell'accrescere la ricchezza nazionale con l'onesto lavoro.13 
 
Finally, the candidate's military program, which surprises for its clarity and independ-
ence:  
 
Come soldato è mio obbligo parlarvi dell'esercito. […] per quanto sia intenso l'amore che [gli] 
porto, ne approvo le economie nell'interesse generale della nazione, e non respingo l'ipotesi che 
siano ancora possibili, anche dopo quelle recentemente concretate; esse dovranno cercarsi nel 
medesimo indirizzo di quelle. È compito del tecnico conciliare la riduzione nelle spese con le esi-
genze della difesa del paese. In un tempo, che l'amor di patria mi fa sperare non lontano, quando 
le provvide leggi sull'istruzione preannunziate dalla parola del Re, avranno portato i loro frutti, e 
che l'educazione civile abbia concorso a formare il soldato, si potrà, senza tremare per le sorti de-
lla nazione, fruire dei benefici del sistema territoriale, sviluppare maggiormente il tiro a segno, e 
ridurre alla più semplice espressione la forza armata permanente, che tanto, ma necessariamen-
                                                          
12 MA, 160, 15, Manifesto elettorale di Luigi Majnoni, 10/12/1894. 
13 Idem. 
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te, pesa sul bilancio dello stato. A codeste leggi intente a favorire l'istruzione popolare e l'educa-
zione delle masse io darò sempre il mio appoggio, cercando che i maestri, quasi ignoti benemeriti 
fattori della moderna civiltà, abbiano insieme alle soddisfazioni morali più equo compenso alle 
loro fatiche.14 
 
Luigi Majnoni is quite obviously an admirer of the concept of armed nation, of the 
German-shaped territorial recruitment system, and is an advocate of the creation of a powerful 
militia to place side by side with the regular army: that is the opposite of the official doctrine of 
the time about what the Italian Royal Army should be.15 
General Majnoni could also modulate his Manifesto according to the kind of audience 
he was supposed to meet. For instance, when he speaks in front of the workmen of a factory 
located in the village of Ponte Lambro, he insists on the social aspects of his Manifesto. 
 
Ottenuto il pareggio, bisognerà non solo renderlo stabile, ma pensare a diminuire le imposte; 
prime fra tutte quelle che pesano sulle classi meno abbienti, come sarebbero le imposte sul sale, 
sulla farina, sui coloniali etc. etc. poi quelle che gravitano sulla terra e sulla industria, perché l'a-
gricoltore e l'industriale messi alle strette dalla gravezza dei tributi non possono pensare ad au-
mentare i redditi mediante l'arte e quindi anche i salari dei lavoratori. […] Per questo però si de-
vono fare fin d'ora delle leggi proprie, che si sogliono chiamare sociali. […] p. e. quelle sull'igiene 
che tendono a migliorare le abitazioni, quelle che mirano a costituire le società di mutuo soccor-
so. Poi le leggi protettrici dell'infanzia […] Con l'istruzione diffusa e con il concorso di buone leggi 
sociali ogni lavoratore intelligente sarà in grado di crearsi uno stato economico soddisfacente.16 
 
National and local politics, and the role of military 
 
In order to success on bringing home a political campaign, officers had to interact with 
press and public opinion – an interaction that they knew how to take advantage of. In 1886 
general, writer and philosopher Niccola Marselli writes to his pupil Sismondo: 
 
Contribuisci dunque tu pure, portando, tu che ne hai portate tante, un'altra pietra al nostro edi-
ficio col procurare che un giornale autorevole di Torino pubblichi un tuo bell'articolo.17 
 
General Perrucchetti is more explicit when in 1900 recalls to his interlocutor the share 
he had in making the Parliament approve some laws, through his constant work as contributor 
for the prestigious Corriere della Sera.18 In another letter, he suggests to Dal Verme to publish 
                                                          
14 MA, 160, 15, Manifesto elettorale di Luigi Majnoni, 10/12/1894. 
15 Cf. John GOOCH: op. cit. 
16 MA, 160, 15, Discorso agli operai di Ponte. 
17 MA, Marselli to Majnoni, 23/01/1886. 
18 DVA, Perrucchetti to Dal Verme, 26/06/1900. 
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some articles «nella Nuova Antologia ed in qualche altro periodico molto diffuso»19 if he wants 
to efficiently support his own ideas. Leone Pelloux reveals that the powerful director of the 
newspaper La Stampa in person asked Dal Verme to become a regular contributor:  
 
Frassati colse l'occasione per pregarmi di offrirti le colonne della Stampa allo scopo di mettere in 
chiaro le condizioni reali dell'Esercito, al giorno d'oggi, e dei provvedimenti che ti sembrerebbero 
più urgenti ed indispensabili. Egli ti lascerebbe naturalmente piena libertà d'apprezzamenti […] 
Egli mostra, giustamente, di aver grande fiducia nella tua competenza, e nelle tue qualità di 
scrittore.20 
 
General Majnoni was definitely not the only military élite member who had unconven-
tional ideas about military institutions and national politics. Issues like these were indeed object 
of a continuous debate inside the institution. During a February 1909 meeting of the Consiglio 
dell'Esercito, the supreme army advisory council that included the designated army com-
manders, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister, the main topic is  
 
if the army organisation is conceived to attain a precise goal, namely to beat an external enemy, 
and therefore the military budget has to be consequent, or if the budget has to be decided by 
the Parliament from the start, and the army organisation has to be planned according to the 
available means.21 
 
The subsequent discussion signals clearly that at the top of the military institution 
there was a debating élite, well aware of the military-political dynamics of preparing a conflict. 
Beyond that matter, officers questioned almost every aspect of their institution, of the state 
they served, and of the society they lived in. General Ugo Brusati, the all-powerful King Victor 
Emmanuel III first aide-de-camp, is convinced for instance that not abolishing the one-year 
volunteering law22 had more political and social reasons than technical ones: 
 
Il legislatore non sembra abbia profondamente sentito la necessità di proclamare la reale effetti-
va uguaglianza di tutti i cittadini di fronte al dovere e all'onore di servire, in qualità di soldato, il 
proprio paese. Il privilegio, ingiustificato, si è infiltrato nel progetto […] E così noi, appartenenti 
alle classi più elevate, facciamo del vero e proprio antimilitarismo, trovando modo di scaricare 
l'onere del servizio militare sulle classi meno abbienti. Ciò non può, ciò non deve essere. […] È 
poi veramente [nauseante] per non dir peggio, la disposizione che concerne il volontariato di un 
anno che non si ha il coraggio di abolire, per permettere a coloro che non possedendo sufficiente 
                                                          
19 DVA, Perrucchetti to Dal Verme, 12/05/1901. 
20 DVA, Leone Pelloux to Dal Verme, 24/02 [1907]. 
21 MA, 172, 1,  Questioni sottoposte al consiglio dell'esercito - febbraio 1909. 
22 The law allowed students, but actually every wealthy youngster, to avoid regular military service by 
paying a special tax and serving a year as NCOs or yunior officers; in Brusati's words, «Si conserva il 
privilegio del volontariato di un anno, per gli ignoranti che hanno le borse ben fornite», DVA, Brusati to 
Dal Verme, 29/05/1907. 
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grado di istruzione per essere compresi nella [esenzione] di cui dianzi ho detto, hanno tuttavia 
quattrini sufficienti per pagare la prescritta tassa di volontariato.23 
 
Brusati is not the only military élite member who blames the Italian ruling class he be-
longs to. After the 1898 crisis, general Afan de Rivera writes to his friend Dal Verme that in his 
opinion the wealthy had to «make sacrifices» in order to smooth the imminent class conflict.24 
While repressing the Lunigiana uprisings of 1894, general Nicola Heutsch sponsores the crea-
tion of a «cassa invalidità per i lavoratori del marmo», that is to say a welfare instrument 
meant to appease the population. Also the general and War Minister Stanislao Mocenni writes 
about the fable patriotism shown by Italian upper classes, especially when compared with 
European ones:  
 
Con l'ultima tua mi informi che sei stato a Brighton a vedere il treno armato per la difesa delle 
coste, il quale al governo inglese costa nulla essendo stato formato completamente a spese di so-
cietà e di privati, esempio che vorresti veder imitato anche in Italia. [Mocenni è d'accordo ma] è 
vano in Italia sperare, almeno per ora, e in tempo di pace, di poterlo costituire con elargizioni 
private sia perché, a differenza degli inglesi, gli italiani non sono così grandemente compresi della 
importanza dei mezzi di difesa nazionale, sia perché la ricchezza è qui più limitata e anche assai 
più frazionata che non in Inghilterra.25 
 
Even the ruthless colonial governor, general Baldassarre Orero, besides his hatred for 
the «quiet life of travetti [bureaucrats] and ministers», shows how much he comprehends the 
complexity of political action: 
 
Io so bene che tutte queste cose a te sembreranno voli pindarici di un bollente Achille e che 
[guasteranno] il quieto vivere di travetti e ministri. E per verità anche senza accusarli di testa 
piccina capisco che i ministri con un bilancio in disavanzo, con un malessere agrario ed economi-
co sul paese, con una camera composta di tanti deputati che stanno dietro una siepe per avere 
un pretesto di saltar addosso al ministero, capisco dico che non hanno bisogno di un comandan-
te superiore che venga a crescere loro le difficoltà in mezzo alle quali già si trovano.26 
 
On a more local scale as well, officers are perfectly conscious that sometimes political 
reasons may overcome more valid ones. In the summer of 1882, young staff officer Luchino 
Dal Verme asks his superior, general Leone Pelloux, why one of the artillery batteries  of his 
division must be transferred from Brescia (the unit's natural seat) to the nearby town of Ber-
                                                          
23 DVA, Brusati to Dal Verme, 17/07/1907. 
24 DVA, Afan to Dal Verme, s.d. [after 1898]. 
25 DVA, Mocenni to Dal Verme, 28/08/1894. 
26 DVA, Orero to Dal Verme, 22/02/1890. 
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gamo. General Pelloux answers in a way that reminds of similar correspondences between 
French generals of l'Armée Nouvelle as gathered by J. F. Chanet:27 
 
Non conviene dimenticare però che Bergamo ha fatto delle spese per avere la batteria; ma dis-
taccandovi uno squadrone in vece di una batteria, il municipio non avrà motivo di lagnarsi.28 
 
Thirty years later, general Pistoja wrote to the by-now general and member of Parlia-
ment Dal Verme about which colleagues invite to a meeting regarding the planning of a new 
railway that crosses their districts, located in southern Lombardy. Both officers are friends and 
colleagues of the representative of another Lombard town, colonel Marazzi, and are poles apart 
with the socialist Cremona representative Leonida Bissolati. And yet: 
 
...ti dirò che pel Marazzi puoi farne a meno. Egli rappresenta Crema che è alle porte di Milano, e 
con Milano divide ogni […] interesse. Non così Bissolati. La Genova-Piacenza-Cremona-
Brennero traversa la più gran parte del suo collegio.29 
 
Ideology, ideas and stances 
 
Generally speaking, the ideology of the Italian military élite is characterised by a pen-
chant for order, lead from above, above all conservation of the state and society originated 
from the victorious side of the Risorgimento – the monarchical one. A model which had two 
strenuous enemies: anarco-socialists, the reds, and these Catholics who were Papal State nos-
talgics, the blacks. Different as they were from each other, these categories were equally hated 
by the most part of Italian officers.30 However, even here in this apparently monolithic scheme 
it is possible to find some cracks. General Albertone for instance, writes in 1911 that he hopes 
that a quick establishment of the universal suffrage law might inspire a radical change in Lib-
eral Italy's blocked political system: 
 
Non attendo miracoli dal S.U. [universal suffrage], ma se non altro da questo sasso nel pantano 
puzzolente, voglio sperare che rospi e serpi, almeno per qualche tempo sentiranno paura e si te-
rranno nascosti. […] Se dal S.U. venissero fuori un 200 sovversivi e un centinaio di sinceri clericali! 
Forse questo sarebbe l'inizio di un lieto avvenire per l'Italia!31 
 
                                                          
27 Cf. Jean-François CHANET, Vers l'armée nouvelle; republique conservatrice et reforme militaire 1871-
1879, PUR, Rennes, 2005. 
28 DVA, Leone Pelloux to Dal Verme, 9/06/1892. 
29 DVA, Pistoja to Dal Verme, 16/01/1907. 
30 “Se gl'intransigenti neri e rossi non si ravvedono si demoliranno più sollecitamente”, SA, Primerano to 
Sismondo, 20/09/1894. 
31 SA, Albertone to Sismondo, 17/04/1911. 
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Beyond the frustration of old general Albertone, which mirrors a certain anti-politic 
behaviour that was widespread in pre-1914 Italy, it must be said that the relation between the 
military élite and the red or black extremes is not as linear as it could be thought. In June 1903, 
general Ettore Pedotti, former commander of the Scuola di Guerra and fresh War Minister, 
does not liquidate the socialist ideas about how to reform the Army as anything but heresy. 
Moreover, he asks a colleague the full text of a socialist representative speech about the issue, 
because: 
 
parmi, da qualche brano riportato dai giornali, che dovrebbe essere molto interessante. Potresti 
tu aver l'amabilità di procurarmene un esemplare e spedirmelo?32 
 
Some years before his 1911 tirade, general Albertone tells to an astonished colleague 
that he himself had been on the verge of being a socialist candidate: 
 
Notizia strabiliante! Mi è stata offerta dai Socialisti di Siena la candidatura pel collegio di Mon-
talcino, con garanzia di riuscita. Ho risposto che “desidero con tutta l'anima il miglioramento 
economico e morale del proletariato, degli umili e che a tale miglioramento dedico le mie poche 
forze”, ma che tale scopo lo ritengo conseguibile colle istituzioni che ci reggono, alle quali dob-
biamo di essere italiani dopo secoli di feroce, umiliante servaggio. Non mi hanno più risposto!33 
 
What is really surprising here, is that Albertone's tone is far from being indignant, or de-
legitimising towards the reds.  
Another military élite member who demonstrates to be in the same dialogue mood is 
general Tullo Masi, the son of a Garibaldino town mayor in the truly red region of Romagna. 
When he finally dies, shortly before the outbreak of the World War, both his republican and 
socialist compatriots, even the political leaders, publicly affirm their grief. Furthermore, while 
serving at the General Staff Command in Rome, colonel Cavaciocchi writes in a report on re-
cruitment that people defined as subversive are indeed «not dangerous at all, and generally 
speaking very good soldiers».34 Lastly, among general Dal Verme correspondents there is the 
socialist leader Filippo Turati himself. 
The behaviour that military élite members have towards the other extreme, the black 
one, is even more variegated. In their private life, most of them were after all sincere Catholics, 
but many others were agnostics, when not atheists. General Albertone defines himself as a «free 
thinker»,35 but as we have seen, he wishes a Catholic delegation to enter into the Parliament. 
Afan de Rivera remains a bit more sceptical, writing that if it is true, in his opinion, that a po-
tential Catholic party could be an improvement for the Italian political life, then it is «sad that 
                                                          
32 DVA, Pedotti to Dal Verme, 05/06/1903. 
33 SA, Albertone to Sismondo, s.d. [1900-1905]. 
34 Italian General Staff Historical Archive [AUSSME], G25 (studi tecnici), Cavaciocchi, “Le Truppe”. 
35 SA, Albertone to Sismondo, 30/12/1909. 
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it has to be said by us, the anti-clericals».36  Old Risorgimento war horse general Cialdini writes 
characteristically that he has «as a rule to get my business in order with Santa Madre Chiesa, 
but much more with the War Ministry»,37 determining a clear order of priorities between life 
and afterlife instances. 
On the frontline in the battle against the black extreme there are, not surprisingly in-
deed, the former Garibaldini. Perhaps, their particularly violent anti-clerical behaviour may be 
explained as a side-effect of their abjuration of the democratic instances of the Risorgimento at 
the time of entering the Royal Army. In other words, having renounced to the greatest par of 
their juvenile ideology, anti-clericalism became even more pivotal to their particular identity 
and self-perception. General Giuseppe Mirri starts in 1886 a diatribe with the Comizio 
Anticlericale of Bologna, that was an association of local anti-clerical notables. Mirri accuses his 
fellow citizens of being all talk and no action, underlining his own different nature, that is to 
say, a still wild Garibaldino who thinks that: 
 
Colle armi da palco-scenico non si vincono battaglie. Non basta che i liberali si mostrino uniti, 
bisogna che lo siano di fatto sempre e costantemente: ed è con questo solo mezzo che credo si 
possa combattere con buon successo il clericalismo invadente nemico dichiarato della patria de-
lla libertà e del progresso.38 
 
Also general Tullo Masi shares this behaviour, even if he was not a Garibaldino himself 
–but his father was. When in 1913 he is the liberal candidate in the Lugo district, and the 
Catholics electoral committees decide to vote him according to the nation-level Gentiloni Pact, 
the general publicly refuses their support. Gentiloni himself goes several times to Lugo to con-
vince Masi to sign the Pact, but the old general does not back out. In the end Masi gain his elec-
tion without any Catholic support, receiving the local socialists' plaudit. After all, until the arri-
val of Luigi Cadorna at the Supreme Command in 1914, the Italian Royal Army is strictly 
secular.39 Moreover, among the military élite ranks there were many generals who were overtly 
Jews, two of which (Ottolenghi and Viganò) became even War Ministers: a truly peculiar 
situation, in the age of the many affaires Dreyfus the whole Europe was studded with. 
Many historians argued that monarchy was indeed the centre of gravity of the Italian 
officer corps ideology.40 However, in military élite members correspondences, there are a lot of 
negative comments about their sovereigns. In 1887 the military attaché in Berlin, Luchino Del 
                                                          
36 DVA, Afan to Dal Verme, 12/04/1904. 
37 Orero-Del Re private archive (Arona, Italy), Cialdini to Orero, 03/06 [1885]. 
38 Mirri Archive, Imola Public Library, Mirri to the president of the Comizio Anticlericale, 17/09/1886. 
39 Cf. Vincenzo CACIULLI, Gli ufficiali dell'esercito italiano dall'Unità alla Grande Guerra, unpublished 
PhD thesis, tutor Giorgio Rochat, Turin, 1993. 
40 Cf. Massimo DE LEONARDIS, «Monarchia, famiglia reale e forze armate», in Rassegna storica del Ri-
sorgimento, anno LXXXVI [1999], 2; Lucio CEVA, «Monarchia e militari dal risorgimento alla Grande Gue-
rra (1848-1915)», in Nuova Antologia, n. 2197, 1996; Filippo MAZZONIS, La monarchia e il Risorgimento, 
Il Mulino, Bologna 2003. 
Managing the Army  Jacopo Lorenzini
  
 
RUHM  Vol. 6/11/ 2017, pp. 197 - 216© ISSN: 2254-6111 213 
 
Mayno, writes that King Umberto I «non deve sapere dove dar di capo» (approximately «is in 
a quandary», but in a rather disrespectful way) about managing his own reign.41 General 
Leone Pelloux's thought about the Crown's honours is best summarized by this line: 
 
Vedrai dal bollettino una certa nomina a grand'ufficiale della corona, nomina la quale dà un 
giusto concetto del conto nel quale si tengono e si devono tenere simili onorificenze.42 
 
Achille Afan de Rivera is even more harsh when he writes about the young Victor 
Emmanuel III foreign policy: 
 
Tu dai la colpa a Prinetti, a Morra, a Zanardelli e Morin della bella figura che ora abbiamo fatto, 
e non difendo nessuno di questi signori, ma tu non ignori che la politica con la Russia è opera 
personale del Re il quale al riguardo è suggestionato dal suocero e dalla moglie. Io fui e resto sin-
ceramente monarchico, ma ti confesso che la politica interna ed estera del nostro Re mi fa pau-
ra! […] E se ciò piace al Re, non piace alla grande maggioranza del Paese.43 
 
Officers opinions about the Kingdom of Italy's foreign policy are not unanimous after 
all. Even if the only high officer who publicly disowned Italy's triplicistic policy was general 
Asinari di Bernezzo, swiftly deposed from his command, his ideas were shared at least by Afan 
de Rivera and Dal Verme: 
 
Come te sono anch'io irredento e quindi non avevi bisogno di confessarmi che nel fondo del tuo 
cuore desideri lo sfacelo della vecchia monarchia austriaca.44 
 
Also the old general Perrucchetti can be counted among the sceptics, as in 1901 he 
writes that: 
 
siamo ben lontani dall'avervi [sulle Alpi] fatto ciò che fanno non solo i francesi, ma gli stessi 
svizzeri, e gli alleati austriaci i quali durando la triplice [costruirono] ciò che di più solido [a 
sbarrare] i loro passi alpini di frontiera.45 
 
The same general Perrucchetti, who some years before was among the founders of the 
Alpini corps, thinks that: 
 
Una buona politica [è tale quando] non isoli il paese e non lo esponga a coalizioni ed a minacce co-
lossali (contro le quali nessun mezzo potrebbe mai bastare).46 
                                                          
41 MA, “correspondence 1887”, 28/02/1887. 
42 MA, “correspondence 1887”, 16/02 [1887]. 
43 DVA, Afan to Dal Verme, 22/10/1903. 
44 DVA, Afan to Dal Verme, 22/10/1903. 
45 DVA, Perrucchetti to Dal Verme, 12/05/1901. 
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As we can see, he detaches himself from the adventurism of Francesco Crispi. Even 
general Ricotti-Magnani, who due to his 1870s reforms can be considered the father of the 
modern Italian Royal Army, is convinced that the latest thing the country needs is to partici-
pate in a European war.47 
A last issue about which is interesting to see military élite members stances is the main-
tain of public order through military means, a thing that happened frequently in Liberal Italy 
when politics stepped aside as it was unable to put a brake on social conflict. One may think 
that generals who considered law-and-order the best policy were glad to become Commissari 
Straordinari substituting for civilian prefects. On the contrary, even a stubborn conservative as 
general Leone Pelloux writes, shortly after the defeat of Adua, how much he despises to be in 
charge of public order in Sicily: 
 
Con una soluzione, anche solo provvisoria, in Africa e col ritorno di una parte almeno delle trup-
pe io sono convinto che le cose cambieranno d'aspetto anche in Italia. Per conto mio, come puoi 
credere, non vedo l'ora di potermi dedicare nuovamente ad occupazioni più prettamente 
militari.48 
 
After the fall of Francesco Crispi and the turbulent last years of the 19th Century, with 
the rise of the moderate Giovanni Giolitti the involvement of military in public order become 
less frequent – or at least, less apparent.49 However Luigi Cadorna, in the summer of 1910 still 
an army corps commander, defines «mortifying» the improper use that the prefect does of his 
men. In Cadorna's words it can be seen that, even when humanitarian or ethical considerations 
are not involved at all, generals are strongly contrary to the public order service imposed by the 
government. 
 
Ora, io suppongo che non le sarà [disturbo] di conoscere cosa accade nel mio corpo d'armata, nel 
quale, noti bene, non vi è un presidio attorno al quale si possa eseguire l'istruzione tattica. […] 
Orbene, avendo dovuto spedire nientemeno che 51 compagnie nella lontana Romagna, i tiri co-
llettivi sono un gran parte andati a monte, il campo della brigata Bergamo è sfumato, ed i due 
campi di divisione li ho dovuti ridurre (per far qualche cosa) ad un campo di brigata a Ceva, 
formando dei regg.ti di fanteria di marcia con unità prese qua e là fra i disponibili. Non so cosa 
accada negli altri corpi d'armata, ma, avendo io dovuto mandar truppe in Romagna fin da Sa-
vona, suppongo che avranno sconvolto anche il III, V, VII ed VIII corpo (oltre al VI, ben inte-
so) che son più vicini, ossia almeno 1/3 e forse la metà dell'esercito! Il ministro disse alla Camera 
che è un utopia il credere di poter rinunziare al concorso dell'esercito nel servizio di P.S. Sarà 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
46 DVA, Perrucchetti to Dal Verme, 12/05/1901. 
47 MA, “correspondence 1887”, 07/03/1887. 
48 DVA, Leone Pelloux to Dal Verme, 31/03/1896. 
49 Cf. Hubert HEYRIES, «L’armée italienne et le maintien de l’ordre dans les villes, de 1871 à 1915, 
d’après les attachés militaires français», in Guerre de rue, guerre dans la rue, Guerres mondiales et con-
flits contemporains, avril-juin 2002/206, pp. 11-28. 
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[…], ma io soggiungo che è più grossa utopia il credere che con questi sistemi si possa mai avere 
un esercito istruito e pronto alla guerra!50 
 
A conclusion: from dissociation to integration. 
 
Sentiments of delusion and disillusion, like the ones expressed by Cadorna's letter, be-
came more and more frequent by the time Europe approached the World War. Lake in the 
surrounding Italian society, also into the military élite anti-parliamentarian impulses took the 
stage. Still, anti-parliamentarian behaviours were already present as soon as 1887, when gen-
eral Morra di Lavriano defines the Parliament «that august and clownish assembly».51 In a 
more ironic way, also general Sironi describes the lower house as «a Calvary» to any man of 
good will.52 General Perrucchetti is way more serious when he compares the Army, perceived 
as good, to civil society as evil: 
 
Povero Petrarca! Se l'antico valore negli italici cor non è ancor morto... purtroppo gli altri la-
menti di Petrarca sono i lamenti d'oggi. Basta, caro mio, seguitiamo a fare il nostro dovere e con-
fortiamoci del buon esempio che dà l'esercito nostro – malgrado i pessimi che dà il paese.53 
 
Albertone keeps the same tone when he wishes his colleague Sismondo to never get in 
touch with the «Montecitorio's lue» (syphilis).54 Sometimes though, it is precisely the Army to 
be signalled as responsible for some of the problems that troubles society. General Bava-
Beccaris, the man who fired on the 1898 demonstrations in Milan, thinks for instance that the 
African defeats are the first fuel to the extremes' electoral successes.55 Some years later, when 
the first civilian War Minister takes office, he deepens his vision, which presents some aspects in 
common with Ugo Brusati's one: 
 
Noi scontiamo sempre il fio delle nostre disfatte. E poi l'Italia si è imbastita più per abilità di-
plomatica che per virtù militare propria […] Le classi elevate, tutti quelli che possiedono qual-
che cosa, considerano l'esercito come un peso necessario per la loro conservazione, delle loro per-
sone e dei loro averi, ma non ne capiscono la sua missione, gli altri che sono poi i più numerosi lo 
vorrebbero sopprimere. E così esso trascina una vita magra, stentata, priva di prestigio e di fi-
ducia nel suo avvenire.56 
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So, the most ruthless of all the Italian generals apparently has more class self-
consciousness than many liberal politicians. And even the reputation of military representa-
tives for being War Minister's yes-men has to be got into perspective, as it is a fact that general 
Morra shows in the Parliament hall only to harshly attack the War Minister himself: 
 
D'altra parte se io prendo la parola alla Camera, cosa che mi arriva men che raramente, 
egli è perché sento che c'è qualche cosa da proporre che ritengo utile e che nessuno pro-
porrà, oppure perché provo il bisogno ineluttabile di manifestare la mia opinione scostan-
te da quella del Ministero.57 
 
However, the behaviour that seems to be predominant among military élite members 
is a participative one, that is testified not only by the mere numbers, or by the vitality of the 
debate, but also by the pride the officers display when writing about their own capability to be 
good politicians. As an anonymous cavalry colonel remarks to the candidate Majnoni in 1880,  
 
Chi ti avversò con lo stolto argomento che nulla delle cose pubbliche possa sapere un soldato fu 
un tal Veronelli, segretario comunale. In Roma, non erano tutti soldati i senatori? In Inghilterra 
non sono stati per 2/3 soldati all'ultima elezione?58 
 
In conclusion, contrary to what much of the historiography on that subject wrote, Ital-
ian military élite members were well integrated, and actively participating, in national politics. 
Not only they entered representative assemblies, proposing and debating law proposals, and 
sometimes taking a stand even against their “own” War Minister. They also took advantage of 
the press and knew how to influence the public debate they were involved in. When campaign-
ing, high officers behaved like full politicians, expressing their own vision of politics and society, 
often in contrast with current ones. After all, they were fully part of the “notable” oligarchy 
which ruled the country. 
Still, the evidence for the new claims made about the higher reaches of the officer corps 
is indicative but not yet conclusive.  The evidence presented here suggests that the military elite 
were a more important contributor to national politics than has so far been recognised.  Their 
role and influence needs further reassessment.  However, we can say with some confidence that 
their views on national and military policy were by no means as uniformly conservative as is all 
too easily supposed.  Further work will show exactly what influence the elite exercised on spe-
cific issues and will open the way to a re-evaluation of the mentalité of the Italian officer corps 
in the troubled decades prior to the world war. 
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